The authors argue that commonly used ranking and rating methods of value surveys may have low validity in cross-cultural value comparisons because participants' reports about values can be affected by factors such as cultural differences in the meaning of particular value terms as well as the possibility that some value judgments are based on social comparison or deprivation rather than on any "direct reading" of personal preferences. Four different value survey methods-ranking, rating, attitude scale, and behavioral scenario methods-were compared. It was found that ranking and rating methods of assessing differences between Chinese and Americans had low convergence with each other and with the criterion of cultural experts' independent judgments. Attitude questions had slight and nonsignificant convergence with the expert judgment criterion. A scenario method of value assessment, however, yielded reasonable criterion validity.
cations in terms of value-behavior consistency. One type of definition implies that value should not necessarily be consistent with the behaviors, such as Kluckhohn's (1951) description of value as a "conception of the desirable" (p. 395), Williams's (1968) definition of value as "criteria or standards of preference," (p. 283), and Rokeach's (1973) statement of value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state is personally preferable to its opposite" (p. 5). It is our opinion that if a value is something that one desires or prefers, then it could be something that one does not have yet; by the same token, if value is only a standard or criterion, then it could mean that one has not successfully accomplished it.
However, the other type of value definition suggests a strong causal relation between a value and behavior. According to social adaptation theory (Kahle, 1984) , values are types of social cognition and motivation that function to facilitate adaptation to one's environment. If values are "functions" for "adaptation," then they should have consequential effects on the value-related behaviors. In fact, this type of approach has explicitly claimed that the causal influence of value should flow from abstract values to mid-range attitudes to specific behaviors (Homer & Kahle, 1988) .
We believe that there are shared beliefs about what are preferred modes of conduct and end-states within cultures, which could best be characterized by the concept of value. However, we do want to make a distinction between value as collective representations and values as subjective judgments made by individuals. A lesson of social cognition is that self-reports about attitude or value are subjective products of mental constructive processes, and that the results of these mental processes are subject to various heuristics, biases, and errors (see Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996 ; for an extensive review on this topic). This article is about the potential sources of error in assessing values across cultures by means of self-reports by individuals and possible ways to reduce diese sources of error.
Cultural Differences in Constructing Meaning
When participants are asked to judge a set of abstract broad values as a guiding principle in their lives, their conceptions of these values could be idiosyncratic and could be very different among members of different cultures just as they are among individuals within the same culture (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) .
Consider, for example, the value of equality. An African American might interpret it in terms of racial equality, a woman might think about gender equality, a working class or blue-collar worker might want to define it as economic equality, and a Chinese person might emphasize social equality. Hence, the discussion of value preferences or importance at highly abstract and general levels could be misleading because of tacit definitions that differ across cultures.
Social Comparison Processes in Judgments About Values
Evaluation of one's own beliefs or values is likely to be influenced at least in part by social comparison processes. The basic assumption of the value survey is that participants assess their own values according to their own beliefs, so that we could aggregate each participant's independent judgments and use the mean to represent the culture that the participant comes from. The problem is that people often make judgments about their own values in relation to their beliefs about other people who are salient to them, hence their responses are relative ones (Festinger, 1954) . For example, an American woman might think she values the concept of respecting elders very much, because in comparison to her acquaintances she believes that she cares a lot about this value. Thus, her rating or ranking of this value might be higher than that of a Chinese woman, who, in comparison to her own people, doubts whether she values that concept as much as others do. However, by looking at other behavioral indicators, the Chinese person might be seen as much more respectful to elders than the American.
For instance, the Chinese person might walk behind the elders, sit after the elders have done so, and never raise her head too high in front of the elders. Thus, although the two cultural groups in comparison might actually differ in the importance of certain values in their life, the relativity of social comparison process can reduce or even reverse the differences between them.
Deprivation-Based Preferences
People often express stronger preferences for something they lack, or believe themselves deficient in, than they do for things they have. For example, an American might think the value of respecting elders is very important because of a belief that elders have not been given sufficient respect in this culture; on the other hand, a Chinese person might think the value of respecting elders is less important because the value has been taken for granted. Moreover, Chinese are more likely than Americans to have experienced that care of elders can be burdensome (Peng & Chen, 1989) . Or consider the value of freedom, an American might take the state of freedom for granted, as a base from which other, more salient values could be compared. The citizen of a totalitarian country, however, might place an extremely high value on freedom because it is something highly desirable that is not possessed. Because the perception of deprivation is also relative (Crosby, 1976; Williams, 1975) (Anastasi, 1982; Cronbach, 1984; Peng, 1989) . Criterion validity, an assessment of the degree to which interpretations, descriptions, and predictions on the basis of test scores or other measures can be supported by behavioral or empirical evidence such as participants' performances, diagnosis of behaviors, or experts' judgments (Messick, 1989) , would seem to be by far the most relevant for determining whether value surveys are really informative with respect to cultural differences. (Campbell & Fiske, 1959 (Campbell & Fiske, 1959 (Fuligni & Stevenson, 1994; Stevenson et al., 1993) . In other research, it was found that Japanese students are more likely than Americans and Canadians to agree that people should keep quiet at the dinner table, not fight on the bus, not spit on the ground, and so on. But real life behavioral observations suggest the opposite behavioral differences (Iwata, 1991) .
This inconsistency between value reports and be- erwise. This discrepancy has been explained in terms of real life or environmental constraints, and in terms of educational aspirations for some minority groups (Bratz & Levine, 1978; Hare & Castanell, 1985; Stevenson et al., 1990 ), but whatever the reason for the discrepancies, they pose a validity problem for value-comparison studies.
In this study, we first checked the convergence of Homer & Kahle, 1988; Pitts & Woodside, 1984; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988; Tetlock, 1986; Toler, 1975) .
However, we found that the value survey results for Chinese participants using Rokeach's Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) have had relatively lower convergence. Although most of the studies investigating values of Chinese people have used author-modified Chinese versions of Rokeach's Value Survey (Appleton, 1970 (Appleton, , 1979 ; see a review by Yang, 1986) or focused on more theoretical discussion of cultural differences (Bond, 1988; Ng et al., 1982) (Feather, 1986; Katz, Juni, & Shope, 1993; Lau, 1988; Lau & Wong, 1992 (Feather, 1986; Lau, 1988) . They found that the top four values for each Chinese group and the bottom four were idiosyncratic across groups with few exceptions (e.g., salvation was ranked at the bottom by three Chinese groups), and not a single value among the top four and the bottom four were shared by all four groups of Chinese students (Katz et al., 1993, pp. 768-769) . In other words, ranking methods do not produce consistent results even for the most important and the least important values for Chinese people. Feather (1986) 6. American-68 (Rokeach & Rokeach, 1989) 7. American-71 (Rokeach & Rokeach, 1989) in the field of value study about the advantages and disadvantages of the ranking procedure and the rating procedure in cross-cultural comparisons (Feather, 1973; Ng, 1982; Rankin & Grube, 1980; Rokeach, 1973) . The major criticism of the ranking method concerns its basic assumptions that everyone has fully developed value systems and a value hierarchy (in which every single value has its unique rank), which might not hold cross-culturally (Ng, 1982; Schwartz, 1992) . These scholars advocate the rating method for cross-cultural value comparisons.
In Study 1, we compared results of the ranking method with two different sets of rating data using the rating method as in Schwartz's Value Survey. The ranking data consisted of the composite rankings, that is, the average ranking of Rokeach's values by Chinese participants in previous studies (Feather, 1986; Katz et al., 1993; Lau, 1988; Lau & Wong, 1992) .
One set of rating data came from a study similar in terms of procedure, sample, and circumstances to the ranking studies by Triandis, McCusker, & Hui (1990) .
A second set of rating data was collected by ourselves, again using procedures, samples, and circumstances similar to those of the ranking studies. These data sets allowed us to examine the degree of correlation of ranking and rating methods of culture differentiation and the degree of culture differentiation reliability to be obtained with two sets of rating data. 
Method
Participants. A total of 100 undergraduate students from Beijing University and 82 undergraduate students from the participant pool at the University of Michigan participated in this study during the fall of 1991. Most of them were first-year students attending introductory psychology courses at the two schools.
Both groups were told dial they were taking part in a study of perception and that the value data were needed as background information. The gender ratio was matched between these two groups (60% male and 40% female). Chongken, our collaborator at Beijing University.
Materials
Procedure. As in the standard rating procedure, participants were asked to rate how much they en- 
Results
For the ranking measure, we decided to use composite ranking differences from various survey results as the criterion instead of the results of one survey because the ranking method of the reliability problems for Chinese value survey results. The average rankings of five Chinese samples obtained by previously published studies (Feather, 1986; Katz et al., 1993; Lau, 1988; Lau & Wong, 1992) and the average rankings of two American samples (Rokeach & Rokeach, 1989) were calculated and used as the composite rankings (listed in Table 2 , columns 1 and 3, respectively). The Triandis et al. (1990) cross-cultural value survey ratings are listed in Table 2, columns 4 and 5, and our own rating results are listed in columns 6 and 7. Chen, Lee, and Stevenson (1995) suggested that East Asian students have a moderacy bias that precludes them from moving their responses very far from the middle of the scale. We followed Triandis' recommendation to standardize all the scores (participants' ratings) across values and participants within each culture to eliminate this possible cultural difference in response style on the rating scale (Triandis et al., 1990) . Then t tests were used to examine the sig- The convergence between one rating study and another rating study. We also checked the convergence between the results of our rating study and the results of the Triandis et al. (1990) rating study and found that, for the 52 value comparisons, 27 were rated in the same direction in both studies. The overall convergence index was .52, which is not different from chance. The convergence index for 29 Rokeach's values was .45; for the 23 "other" values, the convergence index was .61. .08* -1.10 -.01* Note. ">," "<," and " = " indicate the value difference between two cultures. In the ranking system, the lower the number the higher the rankings. In the rating system, the lower the number, the lower the ratings, " The convergence index for Table 3 . The numbers inside the parentheses are the percentage of experts agreed on that direction.
We selected thirteen of the values that had the highest agreement among the cultural experts (more than 70% of them agreed on a direction) with a mean of 86% agreement. These experts believed that Americans value an exciting life, choosing own goals, daring, and protecting the environment more than Chi- It is almost surely no accident that these value differences were so highly agreed on by our cultural experts. The ethnographic, psychological, historical, and philosophical literature are replete with testimony that Americans hold the particular values indicated by our experts and that Chinese favor the particular values indicated by our experts. Work by Bond (1986) , Hsu (1981) , Moore (1967) , Munro (1985) , Nakamura (1964), Northrop (1966) , and Triandis (1995) enables us to have confidence in the degree to which our experts' judgments are shared. More specifically, for every individual value, we could easily find scholarly literature to support our experts' claims. Values such as accepting my position in life (see Bloom, 1981) , authority (see Singh, Huang, & Thompson, 1962; Ho & Lee, 1974; Meade, 1970; Meade & Whittaker, 1967) , honoring parents and elders (see Ho, 1994; Ho & Rang, 1984; Lockett, 1988) , "humble" (see Chiu & Kosinski, 1994; Yang, 1970) , inner harmony (see Abbott, 1970; Young, 1982) , moderate (see Chen et al, 1995) , respect for tradition (Abbott, 1976) (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, & Asai, 1988; Triandis et al., 1990 ). Cultural differences on other values, such as protecting the environment (Goldstein, 1992) , self-discipline (see Ho, 1981; Ralston et al., 1992) , social order (see Bond & Wang, 1983; Earle, 1969) were also backed by the relevant research. No literature that we are aware of suggests value differences that are inconsistent with our experts' judgments.
In this study, participants were asked to rate and rank the values according to their importance. The rating procedure basically followed Schwartz's Value
Survey by using the same 7-point-scale used in Study 1. The ranking procedure followed Rokeach's Value
Survey by using a different scale, in which 1 was assigned to the value which participants thought was the most important to them; 2 was assigned to the value which they thought was second most important and so on, until they had ranked all 13 values. No ties were allowed.
Twenty-six attitude questions were also created, 2 for each value. One item measured the value in a positive way, whereas the other measured it in a negative way. This was done to balance individual differences in response set; for example, the "yes" tendency on Likert-type attitude scales. For example, for measuring participants' value of "accepting my position in life," two attitudinal questions are 1. In general, it is good not to expect too much; that way one does not have to experience frequent disappointments or failures. (Positive item) 2. The higher your goal is. the greater your achievement will be. (Negative item)
We followed two basic principles in the process of creating scenarios: (a) The situation had to be possible in both cultures; (b) the behavioral options had to be specified but would not be seen as absurd or bizarre to the participants from either culture. A total of 26 scenarios were created, 2 for each value. The following is an example of how scenarios measured the value of accepting my position in life:
Scenario 1: Suppose that you have worked very hard in a big company for quite some time, but for reasons that are unclear, you have been passed over for promotion many times. How likely is it that you would prefer to do the following things? 1. Wait for next time and hope for the best. 2. Complain to your supervisors. 3. Threaten your supervisors with a formal protest to the company head. 4. Lower your aims and try to be content in your current position.
Scenario 2: Suppose that you had applied for a job with an organization many years ago, and were offered a less desirable one instead. Nevertheless, you accepted the offer and after many years, you begin to feel satisfied in the job, which you handle very well. You have a nice home, family, and have made many friends during this period of time. Suppose one day, out of the blue, you are offered the job which you originally favored with a big salary increase. The obstacle is that the new job requires you to go overseas for a long period of time. How much would you prefer the following options? 1. Stay on current job. 2. Bargain for salary increase on current job because of this new offer. 3. Go to the new job with some hesitation. 4. Go to the new job without hesitation.
Procedure. The participants were first asked to rate the 13 values in terms of their importance as the "guiding principle for their life," as they did in Study 1. Then they responded to the 26 attitude items (the order had been randomly arranged) on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The instruction for the attitude scale was "Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree with each of the following statements." After they finished this part, participants were asked to rank this list of values according to their importance.
Next, participants were asked to read each scenario and choose the behavior they would prefer if they were in that situation. A 7-point scale from definitely not to definitely was provided to let participants indicate how likely it was that they would prefer each behavioral option.
Finally, participants were asked to match the scenarios with the values. Participants could correctly match 88% of the values with scenarios, which demonstrated that the behavioral scenarios had considerable face validity to the participants for measuring the values they were intended to measure.
As in Study 1, participants' raw scores were converted to standardized z scores though results are entirely similar when it is raw scores that are analyzed. Criterion validity of the scenario method. As expected, the behavioral scenario method had the highest convergence index. Eighteen out of 25 pairs were in the same direction as the judgments of the experts' (one scenario had the same scores for both groups, and we did not include this one in the calculation).
The sign test z = 2.20 (p < .05) for the convergence index of .72, shows that this method was successful in predicting the judgments of cultural experts.
Discussion

Limitation of Commonly Used Value Survey Methods
The results suggest that the method of asking participants to rate or rank the importance of a set of values and then aggregating these ratings or rankings for comparison cross-culturally may not provide a good picture of true value differences. There has been an intense debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the ranking procedure and the rating procedure in cross-cultural value comparisons (Feather, 1973; Ng, 1982; Rankin & Grube, 1980; Rokeach, 1973) . Our research suggests that the agreement between these two procedures is not very high, indeed the agreement of each procedure with itself may sometimes not be very high, and that neither method guarantees high criterion validity.
We were not totally surprised by the fact that the attitude items for the value measurement did not perform significantly better than chance. Nisbett and Cohen studied violence in different U.S. regional cultures, and found that no cultural differences existed between northerners and southerners regarding how much they reported disliking violence and physical conflict in any of the abstract value surveys or attitude studies administered. However, with a survey having specific contextual-based questions or scenarios (e.g., concerning defense of one's propriety, protecting one's female companions, or responding with violence to personal insults), they found that Southerners were more likely to choose violent behavioral options than Northerners. These results are consistent with the actual homicide rates in the North and the South of the United States (Nisbett, 1993; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994) .
A lesson of the great debate about the attitudebehavioral inconsistency in social psychology is that when the attitude questions are nonspecific, not experience-related, and too general, they will not predict people's behaviors (see reviews by Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Tesser & Shaffer, 1990) . The sorts of questions in value surveys are of course even more broad and abstract than those used in most attitude-behavioral studies.
A Case for Experimentation: Advantages of the Scenario Method
It appears that the low criterion validity of commonly used value survey methods might be avoided by using the behavioral scenario method. This method may be useful because it can reduce "noise," such as 
Conclusion and Qualifications
We do not wish to be in the position of overgeneralizing the results from the present study. It does not show that rating or ranking methods cannot have cross-cultural validity, nor does it show that attitude items cannot be generated that are capable of predicting expert judgments, nor does it show that wellconstructed scenarios will always give more valid results than other methods-even for the single pair of cultures we examined. The study should instead be regarded as an "existence proof of narrow versions of each of these points: Ranking methods may correlate only modestly with themselves and may correlate little or not at all with rating methods, and attitude items may not predict expert judgments whereas scenario methods may. But even these relatively narrow points should serve as a warning that validity for common methods of cross-cultural comparisons of values cannot be assumed but must be proved.
